THE Volunteer system, which was for many years the principal means of defending the country, originated in a section of the Militia Act, 1858. The Volunteer troops in the Maori Wars quitted themselves well, it is all the more astonishing therefore to find many units relapsing into a state of inefficiency in later days after their fine begin­ning. This was not, however, through any fault of the men themselves, but rather through the desire of Parliament to spend as little as possible on Defence and the failure to give the force suitable organisation. Drill was treated as more important than field work. Training in shooting was given, but training of every sort suffered from public in­difference. Employers in general were apathetic towards the movement during most of its fifty years of existence, and were unwilling to make sacrifices for it. The men themselves made a very real sacrifice both of leisure and money, since the capitation grants made by the Government did not pay for all necessary equipment. Officers were elected by the members of their corps, attempts being made from time to time to see that these officers reached the required standard of efficiency. The faults of the Volunteer system presented themselves to the public mind with especial emphasis whenever there was a war scare — there were Russian scares in 1878, 1885, and 1894. A series of reports on the Defence of New Zealand was called for from competent overseas officers, but their recommendations were rarely acted upon more than partially. Lieutenant-Colonel Harington presented the first of these in 1869, and in 1892 Colonel Fox made a very important and critical report, which began to be acted upon after 1894, when a Committee of Members of Parliament and Volunteer officers had supported his recommenda­tions. But for a long period before this there had been no fixed policy: during the fifty years of volunteering ten different sets of regulations were issued, and those in force at any moment were often revoked or amended. The general trend of opinion among the reporting officers was in the direction of smaller forces to be trained to a higher state of efficiency and to be equipped with more modern weapons. The reporting officers nearly all commented on the fine spirit of the men, and the lack of proper direction from above. Even after Colonel Fox’s report progress was slowed down by the reluctance of the Minister of Defence to delegate authority to the chief of staff.